A note on urban spatial equilibrium with public goods / BEBR No. 394 by Brueckner, Jan K.

UNIVERSITY OF
ILLINOIS LIBRARY
AT URBAN. > CHAMPAIGN
BOOKSTACKS
Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2011 with funding from
University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign
http://www.archive.org/details/noteonurbanspati394brue

Faculty Working Papers
A NOTE ON URBAN SPATIAL
EQUILIBRIUM WITH PUBLIC GOODS
Jan K. Brueckner
#394
College of Commerce and Business Administration
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

FACULTY HDBKIKG PAPERS
College of CoTtmerce and Business Administration
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
April 13, 1977
A NOTE ON URBAN SPATIAL
EQUILIBRIUM WITH PUBLIC GOODS
Jan K. Brueckner
#394

Abstract
This paper investigates the provision of public goods in urban
areas. Equilibrium conditions for public good and housing consumption
are developed for regimes of property taxes and head taxes. Voter unanimity
characterizes the property tax solution, while the median voter principle
is operative in the head tax solution.

A Note on Urban Spatial
Equilibrium with Public Goods
The purpose of this note is to derive equilibrium conditions for
an urban area with a pure public good, where the level of the good is
decided upon by majority voting. The available papers dealing with spatial
equilibrium with public goods are unsatisfactory for a variety of reasons.
Fisch [3] analyzes a model where the public good has limited spatial scope, but
he never explains how the public good output is divided up across neigh-
borhoods. Wile [4] discusses a model with an extremely restrictive property
tax formulation. Barr's analysis [1] is closest to being satisfactory,
but it suffers from lack of generality due to the use of Cobb-Douglas
functions.
The models considered in this note are built on the assumption that
people consume only a pure public good and housing. It will be seen that
this assumption implies that housing consumption is constant over space,
an unrealistic conclusion. However, since the intent of the discussion is
to provide insight ir.to spatial equilibrium with a pure public good without
being completely general or realistic, the restrictive consumption require-
ment is defensible. The first model below has property taxation, while
in the second model, revenue is raised through head taxes.
As usual, all residents in the city commute to the CBD where they
engage in a production process. The residents consume housing, h, and a
pure public good, z.'*" It is assumed that all residents know the government's
cost function for the public good, C(z) . Each consumer earns income y,
which is exogenous, and incurs comnW-ing cost t(x) , where x is the radial
distance from his residence to the CBD,

Since z is a pure public good, the level of consumption does
not depend on distance, x. Because the utility level of consumers must
be invariant across space, this implies that h also does not depend on x;
housing consumption does not vary over space as in the standard urban
model. The property tax rate & which balances the city budget is
= C(z)/V, where V is the total value of housing in the urban area.
From the budget constraint ph(l + Q) = y - t(x), we have
h (i : c£U 5 *<*» v » z - h >> (i)
where p is the unit price of housing. It is clear that the function p
helps determine V, and that the p function generated by a particular
value of V may not. itself imply the original V value. We will see below
that in equilibrium this must happen; (1) will be an ingredient in the
determination of equilibrium.
Perfectly competitive housing producers maximize profits,
ph(K, I) - qK - r£, where q, the price of capital, K, is exogenous and
r, the rental price of land, £, is endogenous and free to vary with x.
The producer first-crder and zero-profit conditions
p(x, V, z, hyii^K, I) - q
p (x, V, z, h)H2 (K, £) - r (2)
p(x, V, z, h)H(K, I) - qK - r£ =

yield r r(x, V, z, h) , the land rent function which makes maximized
profit equal to zero at all x. Housing output per unit of land, a quantity
which also emerges from (2), is <J>(x, v > z» h) •
In deciding what level of the public good to vote for, consumers
maximize utility subject to their budget constraints. Substituting for
h in u, the maximand becomes
U(
p(l + C(z)/V) ' Z ; * (3)
The function p has already been chosen to make utility constant across x
for any given (h, z) pair; consumer maximization decides which pair is
chosen. Since consumers are perfectly competitive, they take p as given
and they assume their decision has no effect on V, the total value of property
in the city. The first-order condition is
S (y - t(x))pC'(z)/V hC'(z)/V
(4)
U]
_
P
2
(l + C(z)/V) 2 (1 + C(z)/V)
Tor fixed V and u, equation (4) implies that the chosen (h, z) bundle does
net depend on x; people at different locations are unanimous in their
choice of the level of the public good. We will see below that this is
not true when head taxes are levied.
The equilibrium conditions for the urban area are as follows:
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r(x, V, z, h) = rA (5)
t(x)x(Kx, v » z, h)/h)dx = n (6)
J
x
a(x)xp(x, V, z. h)<J>(x, V, z, h)dx = V (7)
U
2
(h
'
Z)
=
hC'(z)/V
Ul (h, z)
'" (1 + C(z)/V) (8)
u - u(n, z) (9)
Equation (5) says urban land rent falls to r , the agricultural land rent,
at x, the urban periphery. Equation (6) says that the urban area houses
its population, n. In the integrand, a(x) is the number of radians cf land
at x available for housing, c*(x)xdx is land area at x available for housing,
and <J)/h is households per acre, or population density. Equation (7) says
that the aggregate property value underlying the p and <j> function is
indeed the value generated by the system. Equation (8) is the consumer
equilibrium condition, and (9) gives the utility level. The variables
are h, z, V, x, n, and u, but there are only five equations; either u or
n must be exogenous. Letting n be exogenous means the city is closed to
migration and the utility level is determined internally; u exogenous
means n adjusts until the utility level equals the prevailing level in the
outside world
.
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The nature of this equilibrium is noteworthy; people are perfectly
competitive with respect to V, believing their decision has no effect on
aggregate property value. In equilibrium, however, this myopia must be
validated; the fixed V value which enters into everyone's decision-making
must be the one. generated by the system. The other interesting property
of the model is voter unanimity: for fixed V and u, everyone agrees on
the levels of h and z. In particular, for the equilibrium values of V and
u, everyone desires to consume the equilibrium levels of h and z. In the
model with head taxes which is developed next, there is disagreement about
the correct level of the public good even in equilibrium; the majority
voting process is central to the outcome.
With property taxes, the tax payment in equilibrium is
Gph = 6(y - t(x))/(l + 0), where 9 Is the equilibrium property tax rate.
This quantity decreases with x. With head taxes, however, each individual
pays a tax equal to c(z)/n*
In what follows it will be convenient to assume that C(z) H cz.
The budget constraint is ph + cz/n = y - t(x) , which yields
y - t(x) - cz/n
_ ,
. . ,,_.
p
=
£ ~ P<
x
'
z
'
b
>
n > (10 )
As in (2), the p function generates land rent, r(x, z, h, n) , and housing
output per unit land, <Kx, z > h, n) . The maximand for the consumer problem is
u( y r t(x)
- cs/n
f g)) (n)
and the first-order condition is
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u„(h, z) c
(12)
u (h, z) np(x, z, h, n)
For the moment, assume u and n are given. Fix x at x 1 and choose t?ie z', h'
pair which satisfies (12) and generates the given utility level. This
pair is the one at which the budget line for an individual living at x'
is tangent to the indifference curve with the given utility level. The
choice of z and h for given n determines the housing price p from (10)
at each x, and hence determines the budget lines for residents at all x
values. These budget lines have the equation p(x, z', h' , n)h + cz/n =
y - t(x), with slope -c/np(x, z\ h* , n) . Each line passes through the
point (h' , z') because of the definition of p in (10). But since 3p/8x <
from (10),
u
2
(h\ z')
>
c
u.(h', z*) < np(x, z', h' , n) as x x . (13)
This means that people consuming (h* , z') at x < x' have an MRS which
exceeds the slope of their budget line and people consuming (h ' , z') at
x > x' have an MRS which is less than the slope of their budget line.
The only distance at which people satisfy their first-order conditions
for the pair (h* , z') is x', arid this was true by construction (see Figure 1)
We way ask whether a given (h, z) pair will be supportable as
a majority voting equilibrium. Suppose someone in the urban area, as above,
satisfies his first-order condition, and the resulting (h, z) pair is the
consumption bundle for the residents of the urban area. If we require that
this person lives at x', the equilibrium conditions for the urban area are
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r(x, z, h, n) = r
A
(14)
x
(a(x)x<j>(x, z, h, n)/h)dx = n (15)
u
2
(h, z) c
—tt r- = —j—r~ r——r • (16)
u (h, z) np(x' , z, h, n)
u = u(h, z) (17)
The variables are h, z, u, n, and x» and as there are only four equations,
either u or n must be exogenous. Let h' , z', and u 1 be the h, z, and u
values from the solution to (14-17). We will now show that this solution
cannot be a majority voting equilibrium unless x' is the median distance
from the CBD in the urban area. Suppose x' is beyond the median distance,
that is, the population living between the CBD and x' exceeds that living
between x' and x. In Figure 2, suppose a candidate running for office
proposed a public good level of z" . Clearly, any person with a budget
line such as B will be better off consuming at b than at a, and hence he will
vote for this candidate. The person with budget line A will be indifferent
between consuming at a and voting for the candidate so as to consume at e.
All people with budget lines with slopes less negative than that of A,
namely all people between some x < x' and x = 0, will, vote for z". Since
x' is greater than the median x, we can always find a point like e and
its associated budget line such that the number of people having budget
lines with less negative slopes is greater than n/2. The z coordinate for
such a point will always win over the z coordinate of point a under
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r(x, z, h, n) = r (14)
J
(a(x)xd>(x, z, h, n)/h)dx = n (15)
u
2
(h, z) c
—
—
y-, r~
=
',
—
i
- C • ( 16 )
u (h, z) np(x' , z, h, n)
u = u(h, z) (17)
The variables are h, z, u, n, and x s and as there are only four equations,
either u or n must be exogenous. Let h' , z', and u' be the h, z, and u
values from the solution to (14-17). We will now show that this solution
cannot be a majority voting equilibrium unless x' is the median distance
from the CBD in the urban area. Suppose x' is beyond the median distance,
that is, the population living between the CBD and x' exceeds that living
between x' and x. In Figure 2, suppose a candidate running for office
proposed a public good level of z". Clearly, any person with a budget
line such as B will be better off consuming at b than at a, and hence he will
vote for this candidate. The person with budget line A will be indifferent
between consuming at a and voting for the candidate so as to consume at e.
All people with budget lines with slopes less negative than that of A,
namely all people between some x < x* and x = 0, will vote for z". Since
x' is greater than the median x, we can always find a point like e and
its associated budget line such that the number of people having budget
lines with less negative slopes is greater than n/2 . The z coordinate for
such a point will always win over the z coordinate of point a under
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majority voting. The same argument holds if x' is Jess than the median x.
Only if x' equals the median x will the associated consumption bundle be
undefeatable under majority voting. Any other z value will always draw
the votes of less than half of the population. Thus to make (14-17) into
part of a true equilibrium system, we must add the condition
x
L (a(x)»Kx, z» h, n)/h)dx = n/2, (18)
which says that x' is the median distance from the CBD.
The structure of equilibrium with head taxes is more complex and
interesting than the structure of the property tax equilibrium. What is
new about this analysis is the emergence in a spatial context of the median
voter principle, which is familiar in non-spatial models of public goods
provision.
If it assumed that land instead of housing is consumed by urban
residents, it is easy to investigate the disparity between the utility
level generated by majority voting and the maximum level attainable by
urban residents. Denoting land by % and land rent by r, we must have
y - t(x) - cz/n _ . „ , f- nS
r = 2 i_^ _ r (Xj ?> £> n ) (10)
The equilibrium conditions for the urban area analogous to (14) - (18) are,
assuming ci(x) = 2it for simplicity,
r(x, z, I, n) = r
A (20)
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ttx
2
/£ - n (21)
u
2
(A, z) c
u (£, z) ' nr(x" , z, £, n)
u
2
U, z)
u^A, z) n(rA + -^^)
(22)
u « u(£, z) (23)
tt(x')
2
/£ = n/2 (24)
In the closed city case, where n is fixed and u is endogenous,
the maximum achievable utility level is given by the solution to the
problem: maximize u(£, z) subject to Tfif/l = n and y - t(x) - cz/n = r I.
The equations characterizing the solution are (20), (21), (23) and
(25)
Since (25) is different from (23) , the majority voting equilibrium does
not maximize u. It is easy to show that if all city residents recognize
the dependence of r on I, then there will be unanimity in the voting process,
and the outcome will maximize urban utility. From (19) , (20) , and (21)
tdWir) - t(x) (26 )
I A'
where AiI/tt = x. Consumer utility maximization subject to the budget
constraint with r expressed as in (26) generates condition (25) . The urban
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equilibrium is then characterized by (20) , (21), (25), and (23), which
yield the maximal value of u. This result is not surprising; it says
that if consumers engage in non-competitive behavior, they can raise their
level of utility. Wile has noticed a similar fact in his analysis, but
he attributes the result to the consumers' failure to account for the spatial
externality they impose on others: higher land consumption by one individual
imposes higner transportation costs on others due to the expansion of the
city. A better explanation is more down-to-earth: people can reach a
higher level of utility when they recognize the influence of their consumption
on the prices they pay than when they ignore this effect.
It should not be inferred from the disparity between the majority
voting utility level and the maximal level that the majority voting solution
is Pareto-inefficient. The reason for this is that we have ignored the welfare
of the absentee landlords who receive the urban land rent. Certainly,
it can be shown that these individuals are made worse off as aggregate
urban rent shrinks in moving from the majority voting to the urban utility-
maximizing solution.

FOOTNOTES
The analysis could be carried out with a congested instead of a pure
public good. That is, z, per capita consumption of the public good could
equal f(x, n) , where x is output, n is population, and f„ < 0. With a
pure public good, z = x.
2
A complete model of an urban area (see, for example, Brueckner [2]),
must have endogenous wages and trade-balance conditions. The wage must
be partly determined by the labor demand of perfectly competitive CBD
producers. Other conditions which are required for equilibrium state that
the value of CBD production equals the value of consumption of the good
internally plus the value of imports to the urban area of other goods such
as capital inputs for housing production. The particular form of the
trade balance equations is fairly arbitrary depending on the identity
of the good produced in the CBD. Alternatively, a city which is closed to
trade must have all prices endogenous. The model we analyse in this note
is standard in that the wage is fixed and the CBD production activity
is ignored. This is equivalent to assuming constant returns to scale in
CBD production so that the wage is independent of output and ignoring
trade balance reaulrements.
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